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JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§78A-2-l02(3)(j) (2008).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendants agree with Plaintiffs' Statement of the Case with the
following exceptions. First, this case arises out of a citation issued to Jeff
Howe ("Howe"), and his subsequent prosecution. Plaintiffs' statement that
it arises from an alleged "arrest" is argumentative, not factual. Second,
Judge Iwasaki dismissed the criminal prosecution of Howe on a directed
verdict, concluding that the City prosecutors failed to produce "evidence
establishing [Howe's] criminal intent," or that he "knowingly or
intentionally made false representations to Salt Lake City dispatch or made a
false alarm as defined by Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-105(1)." Finally,
Plaintiffs' statement regarding the bases for the trial court's ruling granting
summary judgment to Defendants is incomplete and overly simplistic. It
suffices to state that the trial court granted Defendants' Motion for Summary
Judgment and denied Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment.
RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS' STATEMENT OF THE FACTS"
Defendants generally object to the five lettered captions of Plaintiffs'
Statement of The Facts (designated "A" through "E"). Rather than
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statements of fact supported by citation to the record, they are statements of
allegation, conclusion, and argument intended to persuade the Court
regarding facts which they claim support their assertions. These
introductory paragraphs of argument should be stricken, or at least
disregarded, by the Court.
Notwithstanding this objection, Defendants respond to the specific
paragraphs of Plaintiffs' Statement of The Facts as follows:
Paragraph 1: No citation to the factual record supports Plaintiffs'
allegation that any "ongoing" or "heated debate" has existed between
Plaintiffs and the City for "the past 10 years." This is merely an
unsupported allegation contained m Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint. R 112113. In truth, the record demonstrates otherwise. Any such "debate" was
effectively ended when the City adopted and effectuated a verified response
ordinance m December 2000 See Plaintiffs' Statement of The Facts, ^j 2, R
990-9f Plaintiffs'Appendix, No 7.
Paragraph 6: It is important to note that neither Jeny nor Jeff Howe
were signatones to this advertisement. R 2312.
Paragraph 8 It is important to note that none of the statements
attributed to Defendant Shanna Werner ("Werner") m this paragraph had
anything to do with any of the Plaintiffs
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Paragraph 11: This statement of "fact" is not accurate, and takes
Werner's deposition out of context. Werner clearly testified in her
deposition that this statement "may have been [true] that week. It may have
been a bad week for Peak Alarm customers to call me," and that she does
not specifically remember the "context or the time frame of when I wrote
that." R. 2391 at 288:21-24. She further testified that in her experience as
Alarm Coordinator for the Salt Lake City Police Department, she did not
believe that Peak Alarm had more complaints than all the other alarm
companies put together. She testified, cc[n]o. Peak has had their share of
complaints. No, I would not say it was more." Id. at 289:11-12.
Paragraph 12: Defendants object to the argumentative and conclusory
statements made by Plaintiffs in paragraph 12 regarding Werner and Bryant
"tarring" the alarm industry and Peak Alarm specifically, or that they
"deployed threats" toward any Plaintiff. No record citation supports this
allegation regarding Peak Alarm specifically. Again, it is important to note
that none of the six cited statements or alleged actions in this paragraph have
anything to do with Peak Alarm, Jerry or Jeff Howe specifically.
Defendants further object to Plaintiffs' editorialization in
subparagraphs e and f Werner did not "threaten" anyone at the alarm
industry conference, nor did Bryant give a "preview" of what the City would
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"bring dowi i on I lowe ji ist weeks later " Vhcsr :\r^\^^c^::iV\ c --vi
misleading comments should be stricken or disregarded by the Court.
Paragraph 2 3 : It is important to note that Peak Alarm's dispatcher,
Brooke Mills, called Salt Lake ('\\\ Police i)i>pjidi to simply report a
b u rg 1 ai al ai 1 1 1 a.t a b i i s i n e s s, an d 11 i at t v o k i d s 1 I ad i i 11 I 11 I t o 11 :i. e s c h o o 1.
Paragraph 25: i ; i-:••.-•" *

•-- • • • :-.-r \- - . , - P - T I T N . -

,.\

H o w e that there was a "panic" situation at West High. Petersen told Howe
there w a s an "emergency situation" at West High - an alarm, unknown
intruders, verification at the scene, but the police would not respond R.
/'/'-•_ ai * •'•. Petersen did not give H o w e any specific information regarding
W;K> '-> as <.': •.•'..":

"

' '-s;" ; ing to Petersen, I l o w e then called Salt

! ulc i 'itv I ):<natuh.
According to Mills, she told H o w e she "had a burglar alarm at West
High School, that there w a s a woman inside that worked there and stated
that there was two people inside the school
there

that w e r e n ' t supposed to be

tl iat si ic war ited i I le to dispatel i tl le police, and 1:1 lat tl ie police woi ild

i lot respond ' R. 8 7 ? at 28:1 3 19 Mills testifiec 1 that sh< * did i lot recall ri
she told Howe whether the woman appeared to be panicked, or whether she
said it was an emergency situation. R. 822-23 at 28:23 to 29:3. At that
point, Howe told Mills he would take care of it, and Mills went back to her

4

desk. R. 823 at 29:4-6. When she returned to her desk, she put the alarm on
hold and continued with other alarms. Id. at 29:7-10.
Paragraph 26: The quoted portion of the transcript of Howe's report
to Salt Lake City Dispatch clearly demonstrates that he called in "an actual
burglar alarm." R. 831 at 3:1-5. In fact, he stated it was an "alarm" twice.
He abruptly changed his report upon discovering that the police department
did not respond to burglar alarms, reporting that it was really "an actual
burglary in progress." Id. at 3:8-9. The police dispatcher, Joann Ryan
("Ryan"), challenged Howe's report of a "burglary in progress," stating that
Peak Alarm's dispatcher (and Howe himself) stated it was merely an alarm.
Howe then stated that "my guard" was on scene and asking for police
assistance.
The remainder of the conversation, conveniently omitted by Plaintiffs
in their brief, is particularly telling.
Howe: Okay. And I'll talk to her about that just to clarify that, but no,
this is an actual break-in.
Ryan: And where do we meet you guard at?
Howe: Just in front of the school.
Ryan: Is he in uniform or she?
Howe: Yes, he is.
Ryan: Alrighty.
R. 831-32 at 3:19 to 4:8.
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Paragraph 42; Any claimed error in Officer Wihongi's report is
immaterial and irrelevant to the issues presented in this appeal.
Paragraph 43: Any claimed omission in Officer Wihongi5s report is
immaterial and irrelevant to the issues presented in tl lis appeal.
Paragraph 4y

;!

—.—-/d

V^\^-!:'

'-'

-•

- f .:j'a^r:ip

Plaintiffs, taken out of context and in isolation, is misleading. In this portion
of his deposition, Bryant was explaining why he took it upon himself to
issue a citation to Howe, rather than asking a subordinate to do it. The
investigating officer on the scene at West High School, Officer Wihongi,
clearly testified that h is investigation led him to conclude that I lowe
intentionally misled police dispatchers and police officer's by providing false
information in order to initiate a police response he could not otherwise
obtain, and he passed his conclusions on to Bryant. /?. / / 72-73 at 75:17 to
76:2; R. 1175-76 at 78:10to 79:1; R. 1179 at 116:5-8; R. 1180 at 117:111* -

:/ v

,; ,

-„

'i a

MJ.W

/

-

''v/_ *.

Paragraph 56: ' I his statei nei it ol fact is ii icomplete and n lisleading.
In addition to the factors identified by Plaintiffs in this paragraph, Bryant
also based his probable cause determination on the fact that Howe reported a
burglary in progress, rather than a simple alarm. R, 2148 at 94:23-25; 2150
at 102:25 to 103:11 and 1(14:9-14. Bryant and Wihongi both concluded that
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when Howe reported a burglary in progress to police dispatch, he knew that
his report was false. Id.
Paragraph 57: See response to paragraph 56.
Paragraph 58: See response to paragraph 56.
Paragraph 61: The facts asserted in this paragraph are irrelevant to the
issues on appeal.
Paragraph 62: The facts asserted in this paragraph are irrelevant to the
issues on appeal.
Paragraph 63: The facts asserted in this paragraph are irrelevant to the
issues on appeal.
Paragraph 64: The facts asserted in this paragraph are irrelevant to the
issues on appeal.
Paragraph 65: The facts asserted in this paragraph are irrelevant to the
issues on appeal.
Paragraph 66: Werner's opinions regarding Howe's knowledge or
intent are irrelevant to the issues on appeal. Further, Werner did not testify
that she has no "information" whether Jeff Howe "knowingly" provided
false information. She testified that she had no "evidence" of such.
Werner's inability to read Howe's mind is admitted.
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Paragraph 67: This assertion of "fact" is blatantly false and contrary
to the factual record. Officer Wihongi testified repeatedly that he believed
that Jeff Howe knowingly provided false information to SLCPD dispatch. "I
beiiex c ne [\ iowe] gave inaccurate information to initiate a police response."
R 117 2 at 7 5; ! 8 In response to tl ic followii ig qi lestioi i by com isel, "Do you
believe, as yoi i sit here today, that he [I Iowe] intentiona by gave inacci irat e
information? . . . That is, he gave information that he knew was false?,"
Wihongi replied "Yes." Id. at 75:20-76:2. He testified that "I think that
there was enough evidence that I collected that Jeff Howe intentionally
u !b:Cv.. p o , t ^ . ;-.J.-..C:.- a .. .r^paLcnei ^ vji! mai Ua\

-

> (•.:

'0-<v

probable cause to suggest that he gave misinformation to the Police
Department when they responded on this alarm." 11 1180 at 117:12-15.

In

spite of his consistent and firm responses regarding his belief that Howe
gave false information, counsel pressed Officer Wihongi to do the
n i rpossible, t : • x»i x ic i ip " ? ;it! I 1 lard evidence o1 wl i at was oi I Jeff] lowe's
mind when he called dispatch. Officer Wihongi acknowledged :h*n iv 7\-A
not know. It 1190-92 at 185:4-7, 186:16 to 187:6.
Paragraph 74: The inadmissible opinions of Ron Walters should be
stricken or disregarded by the Court.
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Paragraph 75: The inadmissible opinions of John Mabry should be
stricken or disregarded by the Court.
Paragraph 76: Werner's opinions regarding the potential success of
Howe's prosecution are irrelevant to the issues on appeal.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court properly concluded that Plaintiffs failed to demonstrate
a lack of probable cause. The probable cause standard is a "practical,
nontechnical conception," designed to operate in conjunction with the
"commonsense," "practical considerations of everyday life," rather than the
elaborate rules employed by "legal technicians." Probable cause requires
"only a probability of substantial chance of criminal activity," rather than
"an actual showing of such activity."
Here, under the totality of the circumstances, Bryant had probable
cause to believe Howe violated the false alarm statute. Howe reported a
"burglary in progress," an "actual break-in," when in reality it was only an
alarm call from West High School after two teenage girls walked into the
school when school was not in session. Howe claimed that a uniformed
male guard had visually confirmed the burglary in progress, and would meet
officers in front of the school. In reality, the person reporting the alarms was
a female cafeteria worker. The investigating officer concluded that Howe
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intentionally and knowingly provided false information of the crime to
police dispatch m order to obtain a police response that he could not have
otherwise gotten Based on this information, Bryant issued a misdemeanor
citation to Howe, reasonably concluding that probable cause existed to
believe that Howe committed a violation of the law.
The fact that Howe won a dnected verdict m his criminal trial does
not conclusively establish a lack of probable cause, and Plaintiffs' claims of
estoppel do not apply because the parties, issues and standards between the
criminal trial and this civil action are entirely different.
The trial court properly applied the Utah Governmental Immunity Act
to this case, holding that Plaintiffs failed to allege that Defendants acted with
fraud or malice, as required m the notice of claim provisions of the
Immunity Act. The trial court correctly held that Plaintiffs failed to file a
compliant notice of claim withm one yeai of the accrual of then causes of
action Even if this Couit disagiees, Plaintiffs' causes of action would have
been dismissed on other grounds, so the trial court's error (if any) would be
haimless
Finally, the Defendants weie properly granted qualified immunity on
Plaintiffs' fedeial civil rights causes of action Plaintiffs failed to
demonstiate a lack of piobable cause, there is no Fourth Amendment
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malicious prosecution claim where, as here, Howe was never incarcerated,
and the trial court properly dismissed new causes of action that were first
raised by Plaintiffs in their opposition to summary judgment. Further,
Plaintiffs' Fourteenth Amendment claims fail due to their inability to
demonstrate any extreme or outi'ageous conduct on the part of Defendants
that is truly conscience shocking. Finally, the City and supervisory
Defendants were properly dismissed because there is no competent evidence
to support Plaintiffs' claims of ongoing tortuous conduct, failure to
discipline, unconstitutional policy, or personal participation by the
supervisory defendants.
ARGUMENT
I.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN CONCLUDING
THAT PLAINTIFFS FAILED TO DEMONSTRATE A
LACK OF PROBABLE CAUSE
Plaintiffs are correct in conceding that their claims in this matter
largely stand or fall on the issue of probable cause. To succeed in their
claims, Plaintiffs, not Defendants, must allege and prove that Defendants
lacked probable cause to cite and prosecute Jeff Howe. Wilder v. Turner,
490 F.3d 810, 813-14 (10™ Cir. 2007) (plaintiff must prove lack of probable
cause in § 1983 action for unlawful arrest); Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S.
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250, 258 and 265-66 (2006) ("In an action for malicious prosecution after an
acquittal, a plaintiff must show that the criminal action was begun without
probable cause for charging the crime m the first place;" plaintiff must prove
lack of probable cause m First Amendment retaliation claim).
The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly reiterated that the
probable cause standard is a "practical, nontechnical conception," designed
to operate m conjunction with the "commonsense," "practical considerations
of everyday life," rather than the elaborate rules employed by "legal
technicians." Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 230-31 (1983). Probable cause
requires "only a probability of substantial chance of criminal activity," rather
than "an actual showing of such activity." New York v. PJ, Video, Inc , 475
U.S. 868, 877-78 (1986). Under this standard, innocent conduct may
inevitably support some showings of probable cause. See Gates, 462 U.S. at
243 n. 13; see also Massachusetts v. Upton, 466 U.S. 727, 734 (1984)
(recognizing that "probable cause does not demand the certainty we
associate with formal trials").
While Plaintiffs spend considerable time attempting to convince this
Court that Howe was not guilty of making a false report, that is not the issue
befoie the Court. A finding of probable cause rests not on whether
particular conduct is "innocent" or "guilty," but on the "degree of suspicion
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that attaches" to the Defendants' evidence. Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S.
119, 128 (2000); United States v. Soto, 375 F.3d 1219, 1222 (10th Cir. 2004)
(probable cause does not require facts sufficient for a finding of guilt).
Measuring the degree of suspicion that attaches to a set of facts requires this
Court to view the Defendants' evidence through the lens of those "versed in
the field of law enforcement," not applying the "library analysis" employed
by constitutional "scholars." Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 742 (1983).
A.
PLAINTIFFS FAILED TO DEMONSTRATE
A LACK OF PROBABLE CAUSE UNDER THE
TOTALITY OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES.
In examining the events leading up to the citation and prosecution of
Howe, and the reasonable inferences drawn from those facts, viewed from
the standpoint of an objectively reasonable law enforcement officer, this
Court must conclude, as the trial court did, that Plaintiffs have failed to
demonstrate a lack of probable cause.
Here, Sgt. Bryant had probable cause to believe that Jeff Howe
violated Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-105. It is undisputed that on June 27, 2003,
at approximately 8:46 a.m., the burglar alarms at West High School were
triggered. It is further undisputed that a Peak Alarm employee called Salt
Lake City Police Department ("SLCPD") Dispatch to request that SLCPD
13

officers respond to the scene, but was told that officers would not respond to
a burglar alarm. Howe, after being informed that SLCPD officers would not
respond, admits that he called SLCPD Dispatch and told them that a Peak
Alarm guard was on scene asking for police assistance, that the guard
visually verified a "burglary in progress" (rather than merely a burglar
alarm), that it was "an actual break-in," that "my guard is asking for police
assistance," that the guard could be found "just in front of the school," and
that "he" [the guard] was wearing a unifomi. No evidence exists that
anyone told Howe that this was a "burglary in progress" or an "actual breakin," or that any male guard was on scene and in unifomi. Regarding his last
representation of the guard in unifomi, it is important to keep in mind that
the caller from the school, Diane Hoyt, is a woman. All of these reports to
police dispatch by Howe were admittedly and undisputedly false statements.
It is further undisputed that Officer Wihongi, the investigating officer
on the scene that day, spoke with Howe by telephone twice regarding his
report to police dispatch. In his first conversation with Howe, Officer
Wihongi testified that Howe admitted that he made "assumptions" that
turned out to be untrue, but stated that he did "whatever it takes" to get a
police response. Based on his conversations with Howe and his
investigation of the West High School incident, Officer Wihongi concluded
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that Howe intentionally gave inaccurate information to SLCPD Dispatch that
he knew was false in order to initiate a police response. Officer Wihongi
communicated his conclusions to Sgt. Bryant both verbally in a face-to-face
meeting and through his written report.
Sgt. Bryant was entitled to rely on the information provided to him by
Officer Wihongi in his report and the conclusions he reached as the
investigating officer on scene, as long as his reliance was reasonable. See
Oliver v. Woods, 209 F.3d 1179, 1190 (10th Cir. 2000) ("police officers are
entitled to rely upon information relayed to them by other officers in
detemiining whether there is reasonable suspicion to justify an investigative
detention or probable cause to arrest"); United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S.
221, 231 (1985) ("[ejffective law enforcement cannot be conducted unless
police officers can act on directions and information transmitted by one
officer to another"). Sgt. Bryant then consulted with a city prosecutor, Holly
Barringham, to informally screen the facts of this incident and whether any
statute had been violated. Ms. Barringham advised Sgt. Bryant that, in her
opinion, the facts of this case fit within the elements of Utah Code Ann. §
76-9-105, and that the issuance of a citation would be an appropriate course
of action. In reliance on the conclusions reached by Officer Wihongi in his
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investigation, and Ms. Barringham's legal advice, Sgt. Bryant proceeded
forward with issuing a citation to Jeff Howe.
In Utah, seeking the advice of counsel is a defense to a malicious
prosecution action where the issue is whether particular conduct meets the
elements of some crime, supporting the officer's good faith and negativing
any malice. Blonquist v. Summit County, 483 P.2d 430, 436 fn. 11 (Utah
1971); Perkins v. Stephens, 503 P.2d 1212, 1213 (Utah 1972). "An accuser
may justifiably rely on the advice of counsel as to the existence of probable
cause only if the advice is sought in good faith and after a full disclosure to
counsel of the accuser's knowledge and information based on a reasonable
investigation by the accuser." Hodges v. Gibson Products Co., 811 P.2d
151, 160 (Utah 1991) (citations omitted). This defense includes reliance on
a prosecuting attorney's conclusion that a prima facie case exists. Id.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-105 provides, in relevant part:
(1) A person is guilty of making a false alarm if he initiates or
circulates a report or warning of any fire, impending bombing, or
other crime or catastrophe, knowing that the report or warning is false
or baseless and is likely to cause . . . public inconvenience or alarm or
action of any sort by any official or volunteer agency organized to
deal with emergencies.
The facts of this case demonstrate that any reasonable officer would
have probable cause to believe that Howe violated Utah law. There is no
dispute that Howe reported a burglary in progress at West High School that
16

had been verified, when in reality, there were only burglar alarms going off
due to teenagers reportedly walking into the building. No evidence of any
crime was discovered. Contrary to Plaintiffs5 assertions, Defendants have
not admitted that any crime occurred. Further, there is no dispute that Howe
falsely reported that a male Peak Alarm guard was on-scene, in uniform, and
would meet the officers in front of the building. Finally, the investigating
officer talked with Jeff Howe twice about his report, and concluded that
Howe intentionally reported false information to SLCPD Dispatch that he
knew was false in order to initiate a police response which he could not
otherwise obtain. Thus a prudent officer would be reasonable in his belief
that Howe violated state law under the circumstances.
Howe's justifications for his actions do not affect the probable cause
determination. "Once Defendants concluded that the initially discovered
facts established probable cause, they were under no obligation to forego
arresting Plaintiff or release him merely because he said he was innocent."
Romero v. Fay, 45 F.3d 1472, 1481 (10th Cir. 1995). Probable cause is an
objective standard, and is evaluated "in relation to the circumstances as they
would have appeared to prudent, cautious and trained police officers."
United States v. Davis, 197 F.3d 1048, 1051 (10th Cir. 1999). Neither Sgt.
Bryant nor the city prosecutors were under any obligation to withhold the
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issuance of a citation or commencement of prosecution merely because
Howe insisted he was innocent.
Plaintiffs contend there was no probable cause because Sgt. Bryant
and the City lacked proof of criminal intent to violate state law. To show
probable cause for intent, "the State must only prove that its theory of intent
is reasonable.'5 State v. Ingram, 139 P.3d 286, 290 (Utah Ct.App. 2006)
(additional citations omitted). "Knowledge or intent is a state of mind
generally to be inferred from the person's conduct viewed in light of all the
accompanying circumstances." Id., citing State v. Kihlstrom, 1999 UT App
289,1110, 988 P.2d 949; see also State v. Wallace, 2006 UT App 232, \ 23,
138 P.3d 599 ("The Utah Supreme Court 4ha[s] held that intent to commit a
crime may be inferred from the actions of the defendant or from surrounding
circumstances." (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Colwell, 2000 UT 8,
1} 43, 994 P.2d 177)). "So long as there is some evidence including
reasonable inferences, from which findings of all the requisite elements of
the crime can reasonably be made, our inquiry stops." Id., citing State v.
Hall, 946 P.2d 712, 724 (Utah Ct.App. 1997). Significantly, the evidentiary
standard necessary to "support a reasonable belief that an offense has been
committed and that the defendant committed it" is "relatively low." State v.
Clark, 2001 UT 9,ffi[10, 16, 20 P.3d 300.
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The City's officers and prosecutors cannot be held to an impossible
standard of proving, at the pre-citation stage, what Howe's state of mind or
knowledge was at the time he made his report. This would require City
officers and prosecutors to read a suspect's mind to develop the level of
proof plaintiffs argue is required before proceeding with issuance of a
citation or initiating prosecution. Such a standard would make any action
based on knowing falsehoods impossible to prosecute. Instead, the
defendants need only show that their theory of intent was reasonable based
on Howe's conduct viewed in light of all the accompanying circumstances
and any reasonable inferences drawn therefrom.
The reasonable inferences drawn from Howe's conduct, statements,
and circumstances of the incident support any prudent officer's conclusion
that Howe knowingly provided a false report. Plaintiffs merely disagree
with the credibility decisions, inferences and conclusions that the defendants
elected to draw from those facts. Again, probable cause does not require
facts sufficient for a finding of guilt. Soto, 375 F.3d at 1222. After
receiving his citation, Howe was free to argue at trial that his statements
were not false or were not knowingly false, which he did.
All of the above arguments equally apply to the prosecutor's decision
to move forward with the prosecution of Jeff Howe. There was no
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requirement that they be sure of a conviction, only that their belief that
Howe's actions may have constituted a violation of state law be reasonable.
The prosecutors are not required to read Jeff Howe's mind, nor are they
under any obligation to withhold prosecution merely because of Jeff Howe's
protestations of innocence. The mere fact that the prosecution resulted in a
directed verdict for Howe in no way establishes that any constitutional
violation occurred. Indeed, Howe was provided with due process, and he
prevailed. Whether or not the City put on a good case regarding Jeff Howe's
mental state of mind or intentions is irrelevant. The only requirement is that
their belief that Howe knowingly or intentionally made false representations
be reasonable under the circumstances. The defendants have met that
requirement, and plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate, as is their burden, that
no probable cause existed to cite and/or prosecute Jeff Howe.
Here, on summary judgment in a civil lawsuit, the question before the
court is not whether Howe was guilty of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt,
but whether the facts and circumstances within Officer Bryant's knowledge
were sufficient to warrant a prudent officer in believing that a criminal
offense may have been committed. Plaintiffs spend considerable effort
attempting to show that Wihongi and Bryant were unable to read Howe's
mind with regard to intent. Their inability to do so is conceded. However,
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Bryant and Wihongi had more than adequate bases to believe that Howe
may have violated the false alarm statute .
Contrary to Plaintiffs' assertions, an officer's reasonable belief that a
criminal violation has occurred does not require mind-reading capabilities or
voodoo magic. "Unless the court is somehow able to open the mind of the
defendant to examine his motivations, intent is of necessity proven by
circumstantial evidence." State v. James, 819 P.2d 781, 789 (Utah 1991).
Here, defendants need only demonstrate a reasonable belief that Jeff Howe
knowingly made a false report or warning. "Under the Utah Criminal Code,
a defendant acts 'knowingly' if 'he is aware of the nature of his conduct.'"
State v. Johnson, 2007 UT App 392, % 11, fn. 5, 174 P.3d 654, quoting Utah
Code Ann. § 76-2-102 (Supp. 2007). Defendants need not produce evidence
that he acted with fraudulent intent, bad motive, or that the false information
harmed the City. Id. at Tf 15.
Plaintiffs' arguments regarding statutory interpretation are precisely
the kind of elaborate rules employed by "legal technicians" and
"constitutional scholars," not law enforcement officer. They are the
1

Plaintiffs include Werner in their allegations regarding probable cause and
a "rush to judgment." These allegations completely ignore the fact that
Shanna Werner is not a police officer and has no law enforcement authority
of any kind, nor is she a lawyer or prosecutor. This absurd allegation is not
a misuse of state power but rather an invention of it. One cannot misuse
power that one does not possess.
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"hypertechnical" constructions that are expressly disallowed by the United
States Supreme Court. While Plaintiffs claim to argue for a "plain
language" reading of the false alarm statute, it is they, and not Defendants,
who seek to stretch the statute "beyond recognition" by imposing
requirements on the statute that cannot be construed to exist under any plain
reading of the statute. Viewed through the lens of those "versed in the field
of law enforcement," as this Court must, it is evident that Plaintiffs have
failed to demonstrate a lack of probable cause.
In Utah, a "false statement" is "any incorrect or untrue statement."
Johnson, 2007 UT App at ^f 11 . It is undisputed that Howe reported a
"burglary in progress" to SLCPD dispatch when, in fact, it wras simply two
teenage girls walking into the school. Commonsense dictates the conclusion
that an alarm being triggered in this situation is not the same as a "burglary
in progress" or an "actual break-in." This is particularly true where, as here,
the person making the report is an alarm industry professional who should
know better, and who stated to a police officer that he did "whatever it
takes" to get a police response. It is undisputed that Officer Wihongi found
no evidence of any forced entry, damage, theft or any other crime at West
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High School". The fact that defendants, in the face of this total lack of
evidence of a crime, cannot conclusively prove that no burglary actually
occurred that day is meaningless to a probable cause analysis.

I.
JUDGE IWASAKI'S DIRECTED VERDICT DOES NOT
CONCLUSIVELY ESTABLISH A LACK OF PROBABLE CAUSE
No presumption regarding the existence of probable cause can be
established by Judge Iwasaki's ruling on directed verdict because the issues
before the court were fundamentally different, as were the standards to be
applied by the court. Judge Iwasaki's ruling found that the evidence

2

Plaintiffs dispute that Officer Wihongi did not find any evidence of any
crime at West High School. However, they do not present any evidence or
legal argument in support of the commission of any crime that they contend
occurred at the school. The facts are that two teenage girls reportedly
walked into West High, no teenage girls were found at the school, no
damage or theft was discovered, and no evidence of their intent was
discovered during Wihongi's investigation. "An actor is guilty of burglary if
he enters or remains unlawfully in a building . . . with intent to commit: (a) a
felony; (b) theft; (c) an assault on any person; (d) lewdness . . . ; (e) sexual
battery . . . ; lewdness involving a child . . . ; or (f) voyeurism against a child
. . ." Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202 (emphasis added). UA person is guilty of
criminal trespass if. . . (a) he enters or remains unlawfully on property and:
(i) intends to cause annoyance or injury to any person or damage to any
property . . . (ii) intends to commit any crime, other than theft or a felony; or
(iii) is reckless as to whether his presence will cause fear for the safety of
another."" Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-206 (emphasis added). No evidence
exists to suggest they entered or remained unlawfully in the building. As
such, the mere fact that they walked into a public building does not
constitute evidence of any crime.
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presented by the prosecutor failed to prove Howe's intent or knowledge
beyond a reasonable doubt.
Contrary to Plaintiffs' numerous erroneous assertions, Judge Iwasaki
did not rule that "there existed no evidence that Howe committed the crime
with which he was charged" (Plaintiffs' Brief at 27), that "Howe had more
than sufficient reason to believe a crime was occurring at West High
School" (Plaintiffs' Brief at 30), or that there is "no evidence . . . that Howe
violated the statute" (Plaintiffs' Brief at 32). This was a criminal trial on the
merits, not a preliminary hearing or a motion to suppress, where the
existence of probable cause would be at issue before the court. Indeed, the
ruling makes no mention whatsoever of probable cause. The Olson and
McKenzie cases cited by Plaintiffs do not support their contention of a
conclusive presumption of lack of probable cause.

c.
ESTOPPEL DOES NOT APPLY
On page 27 of their brief, Plaintiffs apparently argue that Defendants
in this matter are estopped from arguing the probable cause issue based on
Judge Iwasaki5s ruling in Howe's criminal prosecution. They argue
Defendants had "a full and fair opportunity to present evidence" against
Howe in the criminal trial, and that the trial court below erred in allowing
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Defendants to "relitigate" that issue, resulting in what they claim aie
"conflicting results." This argument is without merit.
There can be no dispute that Werner and Bryant were not parties to
Howe's criminal prosecution, and had no opportunity whatsoever to litigate
these issues. The City prosecutors are not parties to this action. Further,
Plaintiffs confuse the issues m controversy m the two actions. In the
criminal trial, the issue was whether the prosecution produced evidence that
proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Howe intended to make a false
report, or knowingly or intentionally provided a false report. The
prosecution failed to satisfy Judge Iwasaki on those elements, and Howe
prevailed on his motion for a directed verdict. Here, the issue is whethei the
information known to Defendants, and the reasonable inferences drawn
theiefrom, gave them a leasonable basis to believe that Howe may have
committed a crime.
Because the parties, issues and standards presented m the two cases
are not identical, estoppel does not apply.

fl.
THE TRIAL COURT APPROPRIATELY APPLIED THE UTAH
GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT.
The trial court correctly concluded that Plaintiffs' Notice of Claim
(Plaintiffs' Appx. No. 5) failed to strictly comply with the requnements of
25

Utah Governmental Immunity Act ("the Immunity Act"), Utah Code Ann §
63-30-1 et seq As framed by Plaintiffs m this appeal, the trial court's ruling
on this issue was limited to the mdividually-named Defendants. The trial
court dismissed all state law claims against the City on other grounds which
are not at issue m this appeal.
The Immunity Act governs all lawsuits brought against governmental
entities and/or their employees,3 and provides immunity from suit for
governmental entities unless otherwise waived Id. § 63-30-3. Employees
of governmental entities are similarly immune for conduct undertaken m
their official capacities during the performance of their duties, withm the
scope of employment, or under color of authority. Id. § 63-30-4(3).
The Immunity Act requires the filing of a notice of claim as a
prerequisite to suit. Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-11(2). The notice must be
submitted withm one year after the claim anses, and must be filed with the
City Recoider. Id at § 63-30-1 l(3)(b)(n)(a). Such notice is required
regardless of whethei the suit is against the City oi its employees. Madsen
v Bortlnck, 769 P 2d 245, 249-50, 252 (Utah 1988)

3

The Immunity Act was lepealed and le-enacted as Utah Code Ann § 6330d-l 01 et seq effective July 1, 2004 However, it is undisputed that all
relevant allegations m this case occurred pnoi to the effective date of the
Immunity Act's lepeal Theiefore, the provisions of Utah Code Ann § 6330-1 et seq apply to all of Plaintiffs' state law claims
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Utah law mandates strict compliance with the requirements of the
Immunity Act. See, e.g., Greene v. Utah Transit Authority, 37 P.3d 1156,
1159 (Utah 2001). A claimant must comply with the requirements of the
Immunity Act to confer subject matter jurisdiction upon the district court.
Id.

Failure to comply with the Immunity Act's requirements mandates that

the district court dismiss the complaint for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction. Id. See also, e.g., Houghton v. Department of Health, 2005 UT
63, ^ 20, 125 P.3d 860 (strict compliance with notice requirements of
Immunity Act is necessary to confer subject matter jurisdiction); Gurule v.
Salt Lake County, 2003 25, \ 5, 69 P.3d 1287 (same).
"[T]o recover against a governmental employee personally for injuries
occurring during the performance of the employee's duties, a plaintiffs sole
remedy is through the Immunity Act, and to properly state a claim for relief,
the plaintiff must allege fraud or malice." Straley v. Halliday, 2000 UT App
38, f 12, 997 P.2d 338, 341 (Utah Ct.App. 2000) (holding that plaintiffs
failure to allege fraud or malice against governmental employee in notice of
claim divested court of subject matter jurisdiction), citing U.C.A. § 63-304(3) and (4);4 Day v. State ex rel Utah Dep *t of Public Safety, 980 P.2d

4

This section provides in part:
(3)(a) Except as provided in Subsection (3)(b), an action under this
chapter against a governmental entity or its employee for an injury
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1171, 1186 (Utah 1999) ("Government employees are now personally liable
only for fraud or malice.").
Plaintiffs5 Notice of Claim did not allege that the individual
defendants acted due to fraud or malice. Significantly, in opposition to
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, Plaintiffs erroneously argued
to the trial court that Defendants relied on the wrong version of the
Immunity Act. R. 1983, 1988-90. They argued that the 2004 re-enacted
version (Utah Code Ann. § 63-30d-101 et seq.) applied, and that their Notice
of Claim only needed to allege "willful misconduct" against the individual
Defendants. As a result, Plaintiffs never raised the argument before the trial
court that their Notice of Claim alleged fraud or malice against the
individual Defendants.

caused by an act or omission that occurs during the performance of
the employee's duties, within the scope of employment, or under color
of authority is a plaintiffs exclusive remedy.
(b) A plaintiff may not bring or pursue any other civil action or
proceeding based upon the same subject matter against the employee
or the estate of the employee whose act or omission gave rise to the
claim, unless:
(i) the employee acted or failed to act through fraud or malice .. .
(4). . . [N]o employee may be held personally liable for acts or
omissions occurring during the performance of the employee's duties,
within the scope of employment, or under color of authority, unless it
is established that:
(a) the employee acted or failed to act due to fraud or malice . . .
28

The trial court properly applied the correct version of the Immunity
Act, ruling that Plaintiffs failed to file a compliant Notice of Claim within
one year of the accrual of their causes of action5. The re-enacted version of
the Immunity Act in 2004 clearly provided:
It is the intent of the legislature that:
(1) injuries alleged to be caused by a governmental entity that
occurred before July 1, 2004, be governed by the provisions of Title
63, Chapter 30, Utah Governmental Immunity Act; and
(2) injuries alleged to be caused by a governmental entity that
occurred on or after July 1, 2004, be governed by the provisions of
Title 63, Chapter 30d, Governmental Immunity Act of Utah.
Laws 2004, c. 267, 48. See also, Code v. Utah DepL of Health, 2007 UT
App 390, ^ 2 fh. 3, 174 P.3d 1134; Grappendorfv. Pleasant Grove City,
2007 UT 84, U 3, fh. 2, 173 P.3d 166; Houghton v. DepL of Health, 2005 UT
63, Tf 3,fin.2, 125 P.3d 860.
Because all of the injuries alleged by plaintiffs undisputedly occurred
prior to July 1, 2004, the Immunity Act cited by defendants, Utah Code Ann.
§ 63-30-1 et seq., applied to, and barred, all of Plaintiffs' state law claims
against the individual Defendants.
s

Plaintiffs misconstrue the trial court's ruling when they assert that the trial
court erred in granting summary judgment to Defendants based solely on
Plaintiffs' untimely filing of their Notice of Claim. The trial court did not so
rule. The trial court's grant of summary judgment was based on Plaintiffs'
failure to file a Notice of Claim which complied with the fraud and malice
requirement within one year of the accrual of their claims.
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Plaintiffs did not dispute that their Notice of Claim failed to allege
fraud or malice before the trial court. Because they failed to raise the issue
below, it is waived on appeal. "[A]s a general rule, claims not raised before
the trial court may not be raised on appeal." Tschaggeny v. Millbank Ins.
Co., 2007 UT 37, *{ 20, 163 P.3d 615. This preservation rule gives "the trial
court an opportunity to address the claimed error and, if appropriate, correct
it." Id. Furthermore, "requiring preservation of an issue prevents a party
from avoiding the issue at trial for strategic reasons only to raise the issue on
appeal if the strategy fails." Id.
Therefore, Plaintiffs have waived this issue and failed to preserve
their right to raise it on appeal.
Even if this Court decides to consider this issue, it should still affirm
the trial court's ruling for several reasons. First, the Notice of Claim does
not allege that the individual Defendants acted with fraud or malice. The
use of the word "malicious" in generally alleging a malicious prosecution
cause of action against the City and its employees in general does not satisfy
the Immunity Act's requirements. Similarly, the use of the word
"maliciously" in quoting the provisions of the Utah Citizen Participation in
Government Act ("UCPGA") fails to comply.

Second, the UCPGA cause of action was dismissed on other grounds
not at issue in this appeal. Thus, any possible inference of fraud or malice
against any individual Defendant must be limited to this cause of action
only.
Third, the only causes of action dismissed for failure to comply with
the Immunity Act were Plaintiffs' False Arrest/Imprisonment and Malicious
Prosecution claims. Even assuming the trial court erred in dismissing these
claims for failure to comply with the Immunity Act's notice of claim
requirements, such error (if any) was harmless. Plaintiffs' False
Arrest/Imprisonment claims would have been dismissed anyway for failure
to comply with Utah's one-year statute of limitations, which provides that an
action for cclibel, slander, false imprisonment, or seduction" must be brought
within one year. U.C.A. § 78-12-29(4).
There is no dispute that Howe alleges he was "arrested" on July 21,
2003. In Utah, a claim for false arrest/imprisonment arises on the date of the
claimed "arrest." Tohnan v. K-Mart Enterprises of Utah, Inc., 560 P.2d
1127, 1128 (Utah 1977). The same is true for federal § 1983 actions
alleging false arrest. State statutes of limitations for false arrest apply, and
the limitation period begins to run when the alleged false imprisonment
ended. Wallace v. Kato, 127 S.Ct. 1091, 1094-97 (2007). Therefore,
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Plaintiffs must have filed their action for false arrest/imprisonment by July
21, 2004. Because the Complaint in this matter was not filed until April 7,
2005, Plaintiffs failed to comply with the one year statute of limitations.
Even if this Court determines that Howe's alleged false arrest
continued until he was afforded "legal process," Plaintiffs' Complaint is still
untimely. After the citation issued to Jeff Howe was filed with the Salt Lake
City Justice Court, Jeff Howe, through his attorney Richard A. Van
Wagoner, filed a Notice of Appearance, Substitution of Counsel, and Entry
of Not Guilty Plea on July 28, 2003. The certified Justice Court
docket shows the date of entry of Howe's Notice and Plea as July 30,
2003. Therefore, his cause of action for false arrest/imprisonment accrued
no later than July 30, 2003.
Plaintiffs' reliance on Wallace v. Kato, 111 S.Ct. 1091 (2007), is
misplaced. In Wallace, the plaintiff was arrested and detained in jail until
his trial date. The Wallace Court determined that a "false imprisonment
consists of detention without legal process," and "ends once the victim
becomes held pursuant to such process - when, for example, he is bound
over by a magistrate or arraigned on charges." Id. at 1096 (emphasis in
original, citations omitted). The Court further stated: "If there is a false
arrest claim, damages for that claim cover the time of detention up until
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issuance of process or arraignment, but not more." Id. The Court concluded
that a false imprisonment ends "either when the victim is released or when
the victim's imprisonment becomes 'pursuant to [legal] process.5"
Mondragon v Thompson, 519 F.3d 1078, 1082-83 (10th Cir 2008) (quoting
Wallace, 127 S Ct. at 1096 (emphasis omitted)). Thus, the claimant's claim
accrues either on the date of his release or on the date of legal process.
Mondiagon, 519 F.3d at 1083.
Here, Jeff Howe was never arrested, was never put m jail, nor was he
otherwise detained m any way prior to trial He was released immediately
upon issuance of the citation on July 21, 2003. Even m the unlikely event
that Howe can demonstrate that he was detained, sufficient legal process was
instituted when the Information was filed with the Justice Court on July 29,
2003, and Howe entered his not guilty plea on July 30, 2003. In Utah, a
prosecution is "commenced" upon the filing of an Information

Utah Code

Ann § 77-2-2(3)6. Further, when a citation has been issued, cc[a]n
information shall be filed and proceedings held m accordance with the Rules
of Criminal Piocedure and all other applicable provisions of this code if the
peison cited: . . . ( b ) pleads not guilty to the offense chaiged." Utah Code
Ann § 77-7-21(2)(b). Thus, legal proceedings weie clearly instituted and
6

Utah Code Ann. § 77-2-2(3) provides" "Commencement of prosecution"
means the filing of an information or an indictment."
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process initiated against Jeff Howe upon the filing of the Information on
July 29, 2003, and at the very latest, on July 30, 2003, when Howe entered
his not guilty plea. Howe's false arrest/imprisonment claims are clearly
time-barred.
Similarly, Plaintiffs5 malicious prosecution claims would have been
dismissed on other grounds. Plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate a lack of
probable cause (as argued above), failed to demonstrate that any individual
Defendant (other than Bryant, arguably) initiated, instituted or procured
Howe's prosecution, and set forth no admissible evidence of malice (other
than bare allegations, conclusory statements, speculation, conjecture and
hearsay, none of which are admissible) on any individual Defendants' part.
III.
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY GRANTED QUALIFIED
IMMUNITY TO THE INDIVIDUAL DEFENDANTS.
At the outset, Plaintiffs erroneously place the burden of proof on
Defendants regarding probable cause. As set forth in Part I. above, to
succeed in their claims, it is Plaintiffs who must allege and prove that
Defendants lacked probable cause to cite and prosecute Howe. Wilder v.
Turner, 490 F.3d 810, 813-14 (10 TH Cir. 2007) (plaintiff must prove lack of
probable cause in § 1983 action for unlawful arrest); Hartman v. Moore, 547
U.S. 250, 258 and 265-66 (2006) ("In an action for malicious prosecution
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after an acquittal, a plaintiff must show that the criminal action was begun
without probable cause for charging the crime in the first place;" plaintiff
must prove lack of probable cause in First Amendment retaliation claim).
A.
FOURTH AMENDMENT SEIZURE CLAIM.
Regarding Plaintiffs5 arguments on their Fourth Amendment seizure
claims, it bears repeating that this cause of action is subject to dismissal for
failure to demonstrate lack of probable cause (as argued in Part LA. above)
and failure to comply with the one-year statute of limitations (as argued in
Part II above).
Next, while the trial court correctly interpreted the Martinez case in
light of the facts at issue here, and correctly concluded that no Fourth
Amendment seizure occurred as alleged by Howe, whether or not a seizure
actually occurred is not really important. The real question on appeal is, did
the trial court correctly rule that Plaintiffs failed to show, as a matter of law,
that Defendants acted without probable cause? That question is not
addressed by Plaintiffs in Part III. A of their brief regarding qualified
immunity on their Fourth Amendment seizure claim.
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FOURTH AMENDMENT MALICIOUS PROSECUTION CLAIM.
The trial court properly granted summary judgment in Defendants'
favor on Plaintiffs' "Fourth Amendment" malicious prosecution claim based
on Plaintiffs5 failure to show as a matter of law that Bryant did not have
probable cause to "arrest" Howe. Ruling at 33. Plaintiffs' arguments
regarding malicious prosecution under the Fourth Amendment reveal a
fundamental misunderstanding of the relevant case law.
Where, as here, Howe was never incarcerated, his claim for malicious
prosecution must be brought under the Due Process provision of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Wallace, 127 S.Ct. at 1096 ("If there is a false
arrest claim, damages for that claim cover the time of detention up until
issuance of process or arraignment, but not more. From that point on, any
damages recoverable must be based on a malicious prosecution claim and on
the wrongful use of judicial process rather than detention itself."(citations
omitted)); Pierce v. Gilchrist, 359 F.3d 1279, 1286 (10th Cir. 2004) ("The
initial seizure is governed by the Fourth Amendment, but at some point after
arrest, and certainly by the time of trial, constitutional analysis shifts to the
Dues Process Clause."); Becker v. Kroll, 340 F.Supp.2d 1230, 1239-40
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(D.Utah 2004) (Where plaintiff was never incarcerated, her claim for
malicious prosecution fell under the Fourteenth Amendment).
Federal case law is clear that Plaintiffs have no cause of action for
malicious prosecution in this matter under the Fourth Amendment to the
United States Constitution. Further, the "facts51 alleged in support of this
non-existent cause of action are wrong. Bryant's consultations with his
subordinate, Werner, regarding what statutes may apply to Howe's actions
and whether Howe should be cited does not support any allegation that she
encouraged or caused Howe's prosecution. The assertion that "Werner and
Bryant set in motion the facts that led to Plaintiffs' injuries" is absurd.
Plaintiffs' Brief at 42. The record reveals no support for Plaintiffs' assertion
that Bryant expressed a desire to prosecute a member of the alarm industry,
and even if he did, so what? It is his job to enforce the laws of the State of
Utah. Finally, Plaintiffs' citations to the record in support of these "facts"
provide no such support. Id.

DISMISSAL FOR INSUFFICIENT PLEADINGS
"A plaintiff cannot amend the complaint by raising novel claims or
theories for recovery in a memorandum in opposition to a motion to dismiss
or for summary judgment because such amendment fails to satisfy Utah's
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pleading requirements." Holmes Dev, LLC v Cook, 2002 UT 38, ^j 31, 48
P.3d 895 (citations omitted). That is exactly what Plaintiffs did before the
trial court m opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. The
only defamation cause of action alleged by Plaintiffs was a state tort claim
against Werner. Plaintiffs did not allege any federal "stigma plus" cause of
action against Werner or any other Defendant, and they never sought leave
of the trial court to amend their Complaint.
Even if they were adequately pleaded, Plaintiffs' "stigma plus" claims
necessarily stand or fall on their defamation claims, which were untimely
filed pursuant to Utah's one-year statute of limitations. Further, Plaintiffs'
defamation claims could not have survived because they could not have
proven that any of Werner's comments were defamatory.
In order to establish a claim for defamation, a plaintiff must show that
"the defendants published the statements concerning him, that the statements
were false, defamatory, and not subject to any privilege, that the statements
were published with the requisite degree of fault, and that their publication
resulted m damage." West v Thompson Newspapers, 872 P.2d 999, 1007-08
(Utah 1994).
Here, Plaintiffs cannot point to any allegedly defamatory statements
specifically regaidmg Peak Alarm or Jerry Howe. Statements regarding the

38

"alarm industry" could refer to hundreds, if not thousands, of alarm
companies and individuals nationwide. Such statements do not specifically
identify any of the plaintiffs with sufficient particularity to be actionable in
defamation.
Any allegedly defamatory statements regarding Jeff Howe were not
false or defamatory. Shanna Werner is entitled to speak her mind publicly
and express her opinions, as long as she does so in a manner that does not
publish false factual statements regarding Jeff Howe. None of the
statements attributed to Shanna Werner contained false information bearing
on the reputation of Jeff Howe. At best, they are constitutionally protected
opinion, and are not actionable in defamation. "Expressions of opinion,
however, are fundamentally different. Opinions are inherently incapable of
verification; they embody ideas, not facts." West v. Thompson Newspapers,
872 P.2d 999, 1014 (Utah 1994). "More importantly, expressions of opinion
are the mainstay of vigorous public debate. Without opinion, such debate is
virtually nonexistent." Id. The Utah Constitution provides that "[a]ll men
have the inherent and inalienable right... to communicate freely their
thoughts and opinions, being responsible for the abuse of that right." Utah
Const, art. I, § 1. "Because expressions of pure opinion fuel the marketplace
of ideas and because such expressions are incapable of being verified, they
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cannot serve as the basis for defamation liability." West, 872 P.2d at 1015.
Finally, plaintiffs cannot demonstrate that they were harmed by any
statements allegedly made about them by Shanna Werner.
Further, the "stigma plus" claim is analyzed under the Fourteenth
Amendment, and the trial court clearly concluded that Plaintiffs failed to
show any extreme conduct on the part of any Defendant, including Werner,
sufficient to demonstrate a degree of outrageousness and a magnitude of
potential or actual harm that is truly conscience shocking. Ruling at 26-27.
The same arguments apply to Plaintiffs' "non-retaliatory" First Amendment
claims.
Finally, there is no First Amendment right to criminal speech.
Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 75 (1964) (knowingly false statements
and false statements made with reckless disregard of the truth do not enjoy
constitutional protection); State v. Mattinson, 2007 UT 7, ^ 7, 152 P.3d 300
(communications that are false, fraudulent, or otherwise harmful to the
interests of society made intentionally, knowingly or with reckless disregard
receive no protection under the First Amendment).
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SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS CLAIMS
In addition to the trial court's findings, as discussed in Part III.C.
above, that no conscience shocking behavior was demonstrated against
Defendants, Plaintiffs' claims regarding "substantial evidence" of malicious
intent on the part of Werner and Bryant are overwrought and inaccurate.
An especially egregious example is found on page 48 of Plaintiffs'
brief. In a blatantly misrepresented quote attributed to Shanna Werner,
Plaintiffs insinuate that she "intended to punish Jeff Howe for his political
speech, as Shanna Werner put it, to send 'a signal to other alarm
companies.'" These six words were a small part of a larger quote attributed
to Ms. Werner in an industry publication, in the context of Jeff Howe's
prosecution, when she said she hoped that the enforcement of the City's
ordinance goes well, and that if the jury "lets Peak Alami off the hook, to me
that's a signal to other alami companies to call Salt Lake City police and tell
them whatever they want." R. 2523. Obviously, Ms. Werner never stated
any intention to punish Jeff Howe for political speech, nor did she ever state
any intention to send any "signal" whatsoever to "other alami companies."
This egregious manipulation of Werner's words goes far beyond the "sheer
verbal sophistry" they accuse the Defendants of using, starkly demonstrating
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the kind of exaggerated and distorted claims they are willing to employ
against the defendants in this litigation.
E.
SUPERVISORY LIABILITY
The trial court properly granted summary judgment to Chief of Police
Dinse and Assistant Chief Atkinson. As a matter of law, Plaintiffs cannot
demonstrate any "pattern of tortuous conduct" against Werner. As argued
above, Plaintiffs' defamation claims were barred by the statute of
limitations, and none of Werner's statements were defamatory toward any
Plaintiff in this matter. Plaintiffs put forward no competent evidence to
suggest that the City, Dinse or Atkinson failed to discipline Werner at any
relevant point in time, that she violated any policy or standard for which she
should have been disciplined, or that the City, Dinse or Atkinson were even
aware of the alleged need to discipline her. The ratification/encouragement
of Werner's superiors, as alleged by plaintiffs, are taken wholly out of
context, had nothing to do with any Plaintiff or relevant events, and/or
occurred well after the events complained of. Absent a showing of personal
participation in the events complained of, and an affirmative link between
the deliberate actions of the supervisor and the alleged constitutional
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violations of the subordinate, Plaintiffs' claims based on supervisory liability
must fail.
CONCLUSION
Defendants/Appellees respectfully request that this Court AFFIRM
the trial court's decision to grant summary judgment m their favor.
Dated this 2 ^ -

day of April, 2009.

J. WESLEY ROBINSON
Senior Salt Lake City Attorney
Attorney for
Defendants/Appellees
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